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Who Owns the Hills? 
Ownership, Inequality, and Communal Sharing  
in the Borderlands of India
Across the uplands of Northeast India, sedentary forms of agriculture are 
gradually replacing shifting cultivation. In the process, land holdings are 
becoming “privatized.” As commonly held land becomes inaccessible or dis-
appears, and mechanisms that formerly called for the redistribution of wealth 
transform, social inequality increases. The location of the Garo Hills at the 
border with Bangladesh renders the area a peripheral borderland, in which 
the Indian state exerts its presence. In his historical analysis of upland societies 
of the Zomia massif, James Scott (2009) emphasizes how the modern state 
strives to control and “make taxable” all of its subjects. For Tania Murray Li 
(2014), the development of neoliberal markets is the primary driver of change, 
as she shows based on long-term research in rural Central Sulawesi (Indone-
sia). While the effects of both these transformative forces can be clearly felt, in 
the Garo Hills the ongoing dissolution of communally managed land and the 
creation of privately owned plots is nonetheless held in check by the persistent 
social obligation to maintain at least a certain degree of communal sharing.
Keywords: shifting cultivation—markets—state encapsulation— 
privatization—Asian borderlands
*Note: This contribution is part of the special forum “Agrarian Change in 
Zomia,” guest-edited by Erik de Maaker and Deborah E. Tooker
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On a humid September day, Jiji and her daughter Ratmi had to complete the harvest of their hill rice.1 It was arduous work. As is customary, in order to 
avoid damaging the stems, they used their bare hands to wrest the grains from the 
stalks. It was a meager harvest, they said, but they still managed to fill quite a few 
bamboo baskets with rice grains. Hill rice grows on the slopes of swiddens: fields 
that are cleared in the jungle by cutting down shrubs and small trees. The fields 
are cultivated for one or two years and then (in principle) abandoned. Hill rice is 
highly appreciated for its taste, and for those who practice the community religion 
it also plays a central role in many of the rituals that define the annual ritual cycle 
of swidden cultivation. On this day in September, all the practitioners of the com-
munity religion2 (known as Songsareks) had to complete their hill rice harvest, 
and in fact the Christian villagers did so too. That afternoon, Songsareks would 
sacrifice a pomelo in their fields. Ratmi left the sacrifice to her mother Jiji. Ratmi 
had decided to get baptized as a Christian and hence wanted to distance herself 
from the community religion. But for Jiji, it was important to adhere to custom. 
According to the community religion, hill rice is the offspring of a deity, and the 
pomelo sacrifice is meant to purge the “pollution” caused by taking the rice grains 
from the field. Following the sacrifice, Jiji scattered two bundles of rice straw into 
the corners of her field, cheerfully crying the obligatory “Ahuhu!” In so doing, 
she ritually “released” her field, revoking the claim that had previously been placed 
upon it. With its release, the field ceased to be hers. It would be left fallow for 
some years, after which she or someone else might make a new field there.
Jiji was old fashioned, not only in her adherence to the community religion but 
also in her approach to agriculture and her usage of land. Surrendering or releasing 
swidden appears to have been common practice when shifting cultivation was the 
dominant mode of agriculture in the region. But, in the last few decades, people 
have become increasingly reluctant to release their swiddens after cultivating them 
for one or two years. Rather than abandoning their fields, they plant them with 
cash crops such as cashew trees or areca nut palms. As these orchards gradually take 
over greater areas, less land is left for shifting cultivation. This results in shorter fal-
low periods between cultivation cycles. At the same time, the population continues 
to grow, and more people need to live off the available land. With the increasing 
scarcity of land that is available for shifting cultivation, young families who do 
not have orchards and hence depend primarily on shifting cultivation are particu-
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larly affected. What triggers this process of sedentarization? How do people deal 
with the increasingly unequal distribution of land, and what are its consequences?3
This article is part of a themed forum on the consolidation of the “modern” 
state in Asia’s uplands, and its impact on these (formerly) marginal areas in an eco-
nomic, social, and cultural sense. Several important studies have analyzed the dra-
matic transformations that are taking place in the uplands of Asia (Dove 1983; Scott 
1998; Peluso and Vandergeest 2001; Murray Li 2005; Fox et al. 2009; Hall 2011). 
Generally, they see this as a process by which uplanders are giving up their former 
(by and large) economic autonomy to become subject, as producers and consum-
ers, to a neoliberal market economy. In the process mobile communities became 
sedentary, administered, and integrated with majority religions such as Christianity 
and Buddhism. According to Scott (2009, 8), people such as the Garo uplanders 
have historically been evading the state. Since their territory falls within the con-
fines of the Indian state, but in practice used to remain marginal to it, the state has 
taken extensive measures to integrate them into its modern administrative, political, 
and monetary structures in order to make the uplanders’ economic activities “legi-
ble,” “taxable,” and “assessable” (Scott 2009, 5). While Scott’s analysis emphasizes 
the agency, and indeed outright “territorializing” agenda, of the modern state, 
Tania Murray Li has identified much more elusive economic factors, the “rules of 
competition and profit,” as the drivers of change (Murray Li 2014, 4). In Land’s 
End, a longitudinal study of changing land relations within an upland community 
in northern Sulawesi (Indonesia), she argues that in the virtual absence of a mod-
ern state, the highlanders themselves were the ones who took the initiative to plant 
tree crops, which resulted in the privatization of land that had previously been held 
communally. The production of these crops (mostly clove and cacao) made them 
dependent on the fluctuating prices of the market. Moreover, rather than produc-
ing their own food, as they had earlier done, people now had to procure their daily 
food with the money they earned. Notably in this latter respect, their livelihoods 
became much less secure than they used to be, Murray Li argues (ibid., 7–8).
In the Garo Hills, argues Bengt Karlsson (2011, 69), economic drivers are very 
important, but state policies have also played a significant role. Analyzing land 
relations from the perspective of political ecology, he shows how the Garo Hills 
stand out (as do some other upland areas of Northeast India) in contrast to many 
other parts of Asia for the ways that land is managed and owned by communi-
ties themselves. Nonetheless, community management does not appear to impede 
either the privatization of land or the subsequent increase in social inequality. The 
Garo Hills are governed by the Garo Hills Autonomous District Council under 
the Sixth schedule of the Indian constitution. While land cannot be sold to “out-
siders” (i.e., non-Garo), this has not prevented its increasingly skewed distribu-
tion, with some Garo having large amounts of land at their disposal, while others 
lose access to land. This process of internal deprivation has its parallels elsewhere 
in India (Gadgil and Guha 1993, 159) and indeed throughout the uplands of Asia 
(Fox et al. 2009, 319; Murray Li 2014, 9).
In this article, I focus on the moral implications of changes in the utilization 
and accessibility of land. Previously, when the community religion prevailed, access 
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to land was regulated through political mechanisms that were anchored in reli-
gious practices. Once the community religion began to lose ground, as it has been 
gradually over the past hundred years, its stipulations regarding the usage of land 
have been challenged and often overruled. Former practices and conventions have 
not simply been abandoned, however, but continue to hold sway; influencing the 
ways people engage with neoliberal market forces and with the legal framework 
imposed by the Indian state. How is this reflected in the moral justification of 
rights and claims to land, and how are these a topic of contestation among the 
people concerned?4
Ownership and authority
When I started doing fieldwork in the Garo Hills of Northeast India, now more 
than fifteen years ago, my research focused on changing religious practices and 
what they revealed about the adaptation, reformulation, and hence “reworking” 
of cultural ideas in a rural community. I paid particular attention to people’s col-
lective involvement with funerals, which are very important social events among 
the upland people of Northeast India (Pachuau 2014). Along the way, I became 
acquainted with many other aspects of people’s lives as well.
Quite early in the fieldwork, not long after I had come to live in Sadolpara, the 
village from where I would do much of my research, one of my PhD supervisors, 
Willem van Schendel, came to see me. He happened to be in nearby Bangladesh 
and was traveling with a colleague, Mohammad Mahbubur (Mahbub) Rahman. 
Their visit gave me an opportunity to reflect on my research work and discuss my 
initial findings. On the morning of the second day, we went for a walk across the 
hilly land, which involved traversing various streams that had no bridges other 
than tree trunks that had been laid across them. I showed them some of the ways 
in which land was being utilized, including the highly risky “rat hole” coal min-
ing that was common at the time (Das 2014, 82). At one point, Mahbub asked 
me rather casually: “So, who is the owner of this land?” The question, which was 
no doubt meant to be fairly straightforward, took me by surprise. As I tried to 
respond, I realized that the question begged more than one answer, depending 
on how “ownership” is defined, and how ownership aligns with different forms of 
usage. During the twenty months of fieldwork that followed, I gradually gained a 
clearer understanding of people’s relationship to land. In the course of successive 
follow-up visits over the past couple of years, each lasting several days or weeks, 
I have been able to observe further changes in the utilization of land over an 
extended period of time.
According to the Garo community religion the jungle is the domain of deities 
with whom people are obliged to engage if they want to work the land. This is the 
case for both agriculture and for the establishment of villages. In fact, all “life” 
takes place in the deities’ presence. Myths are narrated that describe the primordial 
existence of the deities and how people managed to establish themselves among 
them (de Maaker 2018, 36). Based upon the experiences of preceding generations, 
people know that specific parts of the jungle are the domain of particularly fierce 
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deities. This renders those areas of jungle effectively off-limits for cultivation. More 
generally, in accordance with the community religion, creating a field in the forest 
involves the request of an omen, which should inform the prospective cultivator 
what yield the deities will grant.
I accompanied a young man when he went to the place in the jungle where he 
intended to make his new field. In a small clearing at the center of the new field, 
he hammered an approximately two-foot-long stick into the earth. He split the top 
end of the stick open in an X and wedged a bundle of leaves between each of the 
splits. On top of the leaves he placed a few lumps of earth, and then recited: “This 
is to get rid of the ‘pollution’ (marang). I have seen the land. Give me a dream, 
show it to me in a dream! (Ia marangna ia. Ha nia, jumangsi, jumang nik).” The 
omen called for was indeed delivered in his dream, and proved favorable. All the 
subsequent sacrifices that the community religion stipulates must be conducted 
in a field also testify to the ubiquity of the deities, and to people’s dependency on 
them for a successful harvest. Hill rice is, as I have already mentioned, regarded as 
the offspring of a deity. According to some recitations, it derives from the “mother 
of rice, Rokkimi.”5 Without delving much deeper into the worldview projected by 
the recitations and rituals of the community religion, it is sufficiently clear that the 
deities are considered the jungle’s primordial inhabitants. Given the prudence with 
which people are obliged to treat them, this translates into a certain kind of own-
ership. An omen may be primarily framed in religious terms, but requesting one 
also establishes a person’s claim to the right to use a field. In other words, claiming 
new swiddens draws on both, and perhaps equally, a religious and a social register.
The community religion continues to be practiced in a few parts of the Garo 
Hills, but it has lost its former preeminence. The area in which I did most of my 
fieldwork has many Christian converts, and, since it is most notably the youth 
who choose baptism, it is likely that some time in the near future the community 
religion will no longer be practiced in its present form. This has already happened 
in most parts of the Garo Hills, including all the towns, and most Garo Christians 
consider Christianity to be an integral trait of Garo ethnicity. However, as I have 
pointed out elsewhere, the “primordial” entities do not simply cease to exist for 
Garo Christians. Even though Christian pastors maintain that the deities are sub-
jugated by Jesus and the Christian God, people continue to have doubts about the 
degree to which such control may be effective. These doubts notably surface in 
times of crises, for instance when an illness cannot be explained or cured without 
taking recourse to ideas located within the realm of the community religion (de 
Maaker 2013, 151).
Nevertheless, one important reason for converting to Christianity seems to be 
that people seek protection from the deities. In addition, conversion frees them 
from recurrent obligations to participate in the many invariably costly large-scale 
rituals demanded by the deities. Unsurprisingly, Christians are not supposed 
to make any sacrifices to the deities of the community religion. While there are 
no specific Christian rituals associated with swidden cultivation, Christians are 
expected to annually offer several kilograms of “wet” (paddy) rice to the church 
(most people cultivate a small patch of “wet” rice as well). For Christians, the 
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strong association of hill rice with the community religion renders it inappropriate 
as an offering to the church. Christian villagers describe their offering of rice to 
the church as a thanksgiving, which is in line with the Christian notions that the 
harvest is a gift from God, and that people are merely the custodians of the Earth. 
This suggests that, for Christians, primordial ownership of the land has shifted 
from the community religion’s deities to the Christian God.
When the Garo Hills were incorporated into the colonial state, by the mid-nine-
teenth century, the region was granted a relatively high degree of autonomy. This 
enabled the preceding religio-political structure to be maintained to a consider-
able extent. The head of a village (nokma) gained his position of leadership by 
virtue of being the prime sacrificer to the deities, in which he represented the 
localized matrilineage that he had married into. This also made him, in name, the 
owner of the village’s land. Since Garo are matrilineal, land titles as well as religious 
obligations rested de facto with the wife of the village head, who was the most 
senior person of her localized matrilineal group (Sangma 1981, 62). The right to 
land thus extended from the village head and his wife to the members of the local-
ized matrilineal group of his wife. From the early twentieth century onward, vil-
lage heads have been registered with the government. To this day, this registration 
requires the consent of at least the most senior members of the matrilineal group. 
It is also their responsibility to ensure, in time, that the village head and his wife 
are succeeded. In other words, the village head was (certainly historically) a pri-
mus inter pares, rather than an individual endowed with absolute personal political 
power. Nevertheless, the registration of the village heads with a local government 
body implied the gradual inclusion of what in pre-colonial times appear to have 
been autonomous villages into an overarching legal framework initially defined by 
the British Indian state and later by the Indian republic.
From temporary to permanent boundaries
As long as land is used for swidden cultivation, owning it does not directly trans-
late into a usage right. Rather, anyone who resides in a village can make a swidden, 
and it is the responsibility of the village head to ensure that anyone who wants to 
make a field can obtain one. The location and size of new fields are decided in a 
meeting chaired by the village head. Such meetings are attended by men only and 
are followed by a visit to the proposed new fields, as well as the request for the 
omen described above. Even though no one told me so explicitly, the implication 
seems to be that the “wild” forest poses a danger to women. Presumably, this is 
because it is a place where the deities abound and where wild animals roam. Sup-
posedly, clearing the jungle and making the obligatory sacrifices makes it safe for 
women and children. Even though the matrilineality of the Garo makes women 
the title holders of land, their absence at these meetings implies that, in practice, 
they have little or no say about the ways in which the land is used.
I attended several of these meetings concerning the allocation of new swiddens, 
which involved lengthy discussions about the pros and cons of various locations. 
The village head wanted people to make their new swiddens at a place that had not 
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been cultivated for a long time, since it would have good soil and enough space 
to accommodate everyone who wanted to make a field. Ideally, all the swiddens 
should cover a large contiguous area. If people cultivate together, it is easier to 
protect the fields against marauding elephants and other wild animals that will be 
attracted by the crops once they start bearing fruit. Moreover, at least historically, 
after abandoning the swiddens, entire stretches of forest would be able to recuper-
ate, contributing to the sustainability of shifting cultivation.
However, in the first of several of the meetings that I attended, it soon trans-
pired that the men who had gathered were not in agreement about the new loca-
tion for their fields. Some argued that the location proposed by the village head 
was much too far from their homes (one and a half to two hours on foot), which 
was not feasible for them. Others did not like the quality of the land at the loca-
tion, and yet others expressed hesitance because a lot of land at that particular 
location was known to be inhabited by fierce deities, which made it unattractive 
for cultivation. While the men talked about their new fields, they made reference 
to small streams, hill ridges, large trees, the remnants of paths, and large stones as 
boundary markers. Later on, when we went into the forest, the men easily identi-
fied these, most of which were barely visible to me.
In theory, I was told, the village head has the right and the responsibility to 
tell people where they should make their new fields. In practice, many of the men 
simply refused to follow his counsel, and in the end at least some of them decided 
to make fields at a place of their own choice. The land there was not owned by the 
village head but by a minor landowner. These minor landowners are recognized at 
the village level but are not registered with the government. The fields were made 
with the consent of this minor landowner, which was why the village head could not 
stop them. In the end, three meetings had to be held before the men reached some 
sort of a decision regarding what became the various locations of their new fields.
People almost never farm for a second time exactly the same fields that they 
have cultivated during a previous cultivation cycle. Several years pass by between 
cycles of cultivation, and even though people know which plots they have culti-
vated before, the former layout can never be duplicated. Some people will want 
to cultivate less than on the previous occasion, while others need more land. New 
families may have emerged, while others no longer participate. The size of the 
plots requested is supposed to be self-regulatory. People should not claim more 
land than they can work. That would result in a field becoming overgrown by 
weeds, which is said to be shameful for the person responsible. Earlier, and to some 
degree still, the size of the fields was determined with reference to the labor that 
was available to a family, and, linked to that, the number of people who depended 
on its harvest. These days, however, villagers who have a cash income can take on 
more land than they can work themselves and pay their fellow villagers to work 
their fields as day laborers. This practice is becoming increasingly common, and, 
according to my observations, it contributes to the growth of economic inequality 
within a village. After all, on the days that someone works the field of someone 
else as a day laborer, they contribute to the profit made by the family that employs 
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them. But on those days they cannot tend to their own fields, which is likely to 
reduce their own yield.
Landowners do have a first right to choose new fields, followed by their closest 
matrilineal kin. But landowners never receive payments or tithes of any sort, since 
cultivating swidden is simply regarded as a right that applies to all the residents of a 
village. At one time during my fieldwork, a family from the minority Hajong com-
munity was living in the village and were looking after the cattle of many of the vil-
lagers. I was assured that the Hajong family also had the right to make a swidden, 
even though they could not trace kin ties to any of the landowning matrilineages 
of the village.
Once a new field has been claimed, the land is cleared of all vegetation except 
the largest trees. For several weeks, the branches of trees and shrubs are left to 
dry. Often, a significant amount of the wood is sold as firewood. Albeit profitable 
in the short run, this removes much of the organic matter from the fields, which 
in the long term has a negative effect on the soil’s fertility. By the end of the dry 
and hot season (end of March), when the first rains of the monsoon have fallen, 
the dried brushwood is burned. On the following day, the practitioners of the 
community religion provide a sacrificial meal to some of the deities in the field. 
That morning, everyone who is cultivating a new field (including the Christians) 
uses logs to demarcate its boundaries wherever they do not follow clearly visible 
features of the landscape. Robbins Burling mentions that it is a taboo for anyone 
to move such a field boundary; people told him that anyone who does so would be 
blinded, presumably by the deities (Burling 1997, 33).
From what I have described it becomes clear that in the context of swidden cul-
tivation, land usage depends on claims that people advance vis-à-vis the deities and 
vis-à-vis their fellow villagers. Land use does not depend on fixed ownership titles. 
When it comes to making swidden, the relationship between land ownership and land 
usage is not clear-cut. Claims to the right to use land are temporary and situational. 
Who is able to cultivate which field depends more on the relationship of a household 
toward the village head and other landowners, and on the strategic alliances that 
can be forged with other households, than on any form of hereditary or fixed rights.
As mentioned, the last two or three decades have seen people increasingly plant-
ing their swiddens with saplings of trees such as cashew and areca nut. After culti-
vating a field as a swidden for one or two years they then do not release it but sustain 
the claim that they hold toward it. Areca nuts (also known as betel nuts) tend to 
fetch a good price, and in that respect they are a reliable crop. The nuts are sold 
to middlemen and make their way to factories where they are processed into spicy 
or sweet “mouth fresheners,” some of which also have chewing tobacco, which 
are very popular as a stimulant throughout India. It takes approximately seven to 
eight years for the trees to start yielding, but once they do so the production can 
continue for twenty years or more, during which the trees require very little main-
tenance apart from regularly clearing their undergrowth. A couple of years ago, a 
disease spread in Garo Hills that resulted in the death of quite a few areca nut trees, 
but somehow the effects of that have not been as devastating as earlier predicted. 
Cashew trees have also become popular, notably since cashew nuts have also fetched 
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a good price over the years. These nuts are also sold to middlemen, who resell them 
to factories that process the nuts. So far, year after year the area covered by areca 
and cashew nut groves in Garo Hills is expanding. Although government programs 
have at times stimulated the creation of orchards, this transformation is primarily 
the result of choices made by the villagers, comparable to the way in which cocoa 
and cloves became dominant cash crops in Central Sulawesi (Murray Li 2014, 32).
As swidden agriculture is gradually replaced by orchards, land is occupied per-
manently. Consequently, the nature of field boundaries also changes: while these 
were earlier only temporary boundaries, they are now permanent. When the trees 
planted to create an orchard are still young, they are prone to being eaten by forag-
ing cows and goats, which customarily roam around freely during the dry months. 
People who can afford to, therefore, protect their saplings by erecting barbed 
wire fencing, which also serves to physically set their plot apart. Thus, changes in 
land usage result in formerly temporary field boundaries becoming fixed physical 
objects, which limit people’s access to what is still—in principle—communal land.
State expansion
Prior to its inclusion within the colonial state, the Garo Hills region seems to have 
been populated by more or less autonomous villages. Conflicts between villages 
occurred frequently, leading to strategic alliances that were created by leaders who 
proved themselves at competitive feasting events (Sangma 1981, 65). Even though 
overarching political structures existed, the Garo were certainly not enmeshed 
in a formal legal framework that included impersonal rules of law (Marak 1995, 
61). In that respect they seem to have fit the bill of the archetypical “self-gov-
erning” uplanders portrayed by James Scott (2009, 3). “Legality” was rooted, it 
seems likely, in customary principles formulated by socially and politically influen-
tial people. These principles continue to be of great importance, if only because 
all arrangements with respect to marriage, divorce, and inheritance are subject to 
them. Rather than fixed “laws,” these principles provide guidelines for interac-
tion. Whenever a serious conflict occurs, a meeting is called in order to settle it, 
at which senior kinsmen and, to a lesser extent, women, voice the principles that 
they consider relevant. Given the oral transmission of these principles, they allow 
much more potential for interpretation than do the written and codified laws of a 
modern state.
Customary principles derive their authority from being voiced by senior kins-
men and women, whose knowledge is said to have been passed down from “grand-
mothers’ and grandfathers’ time” (atchu-ambini somoi). As such, these principles 
have been proven by time, and they are not only the assertions of the people who 
voice them but also reflect the wisdom of the ancestors. As well as being socially 
approved, customary principles are upheld by sanctions administered by the com-
munity religion. For instance, when someone acts against such a principle, their 
conduct is likely to be denounced as asi-namja. Such a transgression is said to trig-
ger the risk of “supernatural” sanctions such as being bitten by a snake or another 
dangerous animal. Etymologically, people told me, the expression refers to two 
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siblings, named Asi and Malja. Story has it that the pair went to their swidden on a 
day that was, according to custom, not allowed, and harvested certain crops before 
the obligatory first fruits had been offered to the deities. As a result, Asi was killed 
by a tiger, and Malja was “taken” by a water spirit (Asiko matchaa chikka, Maljako 
buga ra’a), both of which are equivalent to deities in this context. In other words, 
their transgression was met by a sanction from the realm of the “supernatural.” The 
expression asi-namja is also used by Christians, indicating that quite apart from 
literal meanings, all customary principles are backed up by cosmological sanctions.
The incorporation of the Garo Hills into the modern state began in the 
mid-nineteenth century, when the region became part of British India. This 
resulted in its gradual subjugation to the laws of that state, a process that con-
tinued after India attained independence. In the Garo Hills, the creation of maps 
that fixed the boundaries between villages played an important role in this pro-
cess. Karlsson (2011, 137) shows that this mapping appears to have been sparked 
by a “peasant” rebellion that was staged in the early twentieth century. At the 
time, Sonaram Sangma (nowadays recognized as one of the first political leaders of 
the Garo) headed a movement to resist the classification of particular parts of the 
Garo Hills as forest reserves, that is, land for which the colonial state claimed an 
exclusive right to timber. This implied the expropriation of this land from the vil-
lages that had used it before, on the basis that much of it was “wasteland” (Saikia 
2011, 36). Obviously, such claims failed to take account of low frequency use for 
shifting cultivation, the use of the forest for hunting, as well as entire villages relo-
cating from time to time, as is common among shifting cultivators. The colonial 
authorities repressed the rebellion led by Sonaram Sangma, and he himself was 
jailed for being a “troublemaker.” But the events did result in efforts to identify 
which land belonged to villages, and which did not, and ultimately led to the map-
ping of village boundaries. This did not involve a survey of the surface of the land 
itself, which was apparently not feasible with the limited technical means available 
at the time. The mapping of village boundaries as it was conducted in the Garo 
Hills is, to my knowledge, relatively exceptional. The colonial government did not 
do so for the adjacent lowlands of Mymensingh, in which the Garo were also in 
majority (Hossain and Sultana 2006, 144; Bal 2007, 13). And neither has such 
a survey been conducted in, for example, the Chittagong Hill Tracts, which has 
as of late significantly weakened the position of the upland population vis-à-vis 
Bengali settlers (Adnan and Dastidar 2011, 37). I have heard that similar mapping 
was undertaken in central India, but I am not aware of any cases elsewhere in the 
Northeastern region, or in the adjacent hills of Bangladesh and Burma.
The mapping of village boundaries also involved the registration of landowners 
in a register maintained by a dedicated government body: the Garo Hills Autono-
mous District Council. This served to extend state legislature to the village level, 
altering the political balance within villages. Village heads, whose authority had 
formerly depended solely on the support they could rally from their kinsmen, was 
now legitimized by state recognition. The land titles of minor landowners, how-
ever, were not generally entered into the District Council’s register. These minor 
title holders simply do not exist as far as the District Council, and thus the state 
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legislature, is concerned. That these “minor” landowners continue to be acknowl-
edged at the local level (at least in the village where I conducted fieldwork), while 
lacking “formal” legal backing, creates the potential for serious conflicts about land 
ownership. In Sadolpara, minor landowners’ lack of legal recognition is already a 
major source of conflict, which deeply divides the village community.
Registration with the District Council has granted village heads with a right to 
the land that is much more individualized than traditional management practices 
warrant. In other words, even if custom dictates that a village head should not take 
any decisions without the consent and support of at least his wife’s most senior 
relatives and in-laws, state law allows him to do so (Sangma 2009, 55). Obviously, 
this has provided village heads with a great deal of power vis-à-vis their close kin 
and in-laws. It also allows for all sorts of power play among members of a village 
head’s matrilineal kin group. By imposing its legislature, the state has come to pose 
as a new ultimate owner, alongside, but also transcending, the deities of the com-
munity religion and the Christian God. Failure to act in accordance with the laws 
of the state is not punished by the deities but by the court of the District Council 
and can result in fines or imprisonment.
Some village heads have used, and abused, the power endowed upon them by 
the District Council. While a village head is not entitled to sell land, he may des-
ignate it as a permanent long-term lease. A village head can issue what is called a 
“No Objection Certificate,” with which a lessee can request the District Council to 
convert the leased land into patta. A patta is registered at the District Council and 
its holder taxed annually. The right to a patta can be sold, and it can also serve as 
a deposit for a loan. The creation of patta thus individualizes the control of land, 
alienating it from the management of the larger village collective, even if the patta 
itself is located on land that formally continues to be owned by a village head. For 
instance, when the North Eastern Hill University (NEHU) decided to create a 
new campus in the Garo Hills, it bought a total of six hundred acres of land from 
the heads of three villages (Fernandes et al. 2016, 47). Even though the price paid 
per acre was nominal, a large amount of money was involved, which the village 
heads apparently did not share with their fellow villagers but kept for themselves. 
One of the village heads became a coal trader, while another simply invested his 
share of the money. The third, however, lost a significant amount of his share of 
the money to one of the many insurgent groups that are active in the Garo Hills, 
which extorted him when they came to know about the transaction. The person 
who was in charge of the negotiations on behalf of NEHU told me that it had 
taken a long time to convince the village heads of the deal, and that they had only 
conceded when the university agreed to provide a number of jobs as caretakers and 
so on to the villagers affected. The point is that even though the village heads did 
try to seek compensation for the people who lost access to land as a result of the 
transactions, according to the applicable property laws they could keep the money 
gained for themselves, since they are the titular owners of the land and were the 
only individuals empowered to issue “No Objection Certificates” in relation to 
it. In other words, the registration of rights to land with the village heads has 
empowered them to take decisions that may at times go against the interests of the 
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wider kin group that they are supposed to represent, and to whom—historically at 
least—the land titles seem to have extended.
Within villages, the creation of orchards induces the privatization of land on 
an even larger scale. When people do not release a field once they have cultivated 
it as a swidden but instead transform it into an orchard for cashew trees or areca 
nut palms, they effectively make an indefinite claim on that land. People who hold 
such a claim (which nearly everyone in Sadolpara does these days) can try to turn 
their orchard plot into patta. In Sadolpara, Christian families have usually been 
among the first to request patta. Many Christians can at least basically read and 
write, and due to that, more than Songsareks, they have been able to take advan-
tage of the opportunities that holding patta offers, such as taking on an agricul-
tural loan. Christian families, I was repeatedly told, had more opportunities to save 
money, since they could not and needed not participate in the costly redistributive 
celebrations called for by the community religion.
Formally, a holder of patta has the right to sell it (the patta, not the land), but 
in rural West Garo Hills this as of today does not mean that he or she can sell it 
to anyone who would be legally qualified to buy it. As I understand it, any sale of 
patta does need to take the interests of fellow villagers into account, even if this 
is not stipulated legally. Not to do so would be regarded as antisocial behavior 
on behalf of a person who attempted such a sale, to the detriment of his or her 
social relationships with kin and other fellow villagers. During my fieldwork, one 
man earned himself a particularly bad reputation when he tried to sell a stretch of 
patta without informing his wife or her close matrilineal relatives. The patta had 
been registered in his name, which seems to be common practice for the District 
Council, perhaps illustrative of the patriarchal approach to gender so characteristic 
for government in much of South Asia. Yet even if the man was legally entitled to 
conduct the sale of the patta, the fact that he had attempted to do so without the 
consent of his wife and close matrilineal relatives was regarded as unscrupulous 
antisocial behavior and resulted in his no longer feeling welcome in the village. As 
is clear from this example, there is a growing tension between the collective claims 
and usage of land by villagers, the capacity of the village head to grant patta, and 
the “private” rights that holding patta entitles households to.
Ethnicized politics
The penetration of state-backed interpretations of ownership and usage also has 
consequences at a higher level of scale. Garo Hills is part of the Indian state of 
Meghalaya, which was created in 1972 as a federal state with a “tribal” majority. In 
India, “tribe” is an administrative and sociological category that almost unavoid-
ably adheres to stereotypical understandings of human evolution. Communities 
labeled as tribal are from such an evolutionary perspective “‘juveniles’ of the evolv-
ing human society,” and they are characterized by “technology, material culture, 
ideology, beliefs and practices” that are regarded “simple and direct” (Srivastava 
2008, 31). In Meghalaya, institutionalized privileges are held by Khasi, Jaintia, 
and Garo, “tribal” communities that by law qualify as “indigenous” to the state 
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(Haokip 2013, 304). The benefits are substantial and encompass reserved govern-
ment jobs, relief from income tax, and preferential access to schools and colleges, as 
well as the obligatory inclusion of a significant number of “tribal” representatives 
in legislative councils such as the state parliament. The latter is particularly import-
ant, since it implies control over the disbursement of state funding, including 
finances for substantial developmental efforts aimed at the rural areas. Considering 
that Meghalaya has a predominantly rural economy, such funding (most of which 
derives from India’s central government) is an important resource, and control of 
its disbursement translates directly into political influence. Consequently, the eth-
nicization of the state government and its administrative bodies has been condu-
cive to the development of a political atmosphere in which the struggle over state 
resources is primarily fought on ethnic grounds (Rycroft and Dasgupta 2011, 8).
The Garo Hills region has been reaping the sour fruits of this conflation of eth-
nicity and politics, with political groups asserting their ethnic belonging to demand 
rights and resources that they simultaneously deny to people belonging to other 
ethnicities. In this respect, Garo Hills is far from exceptional within India. The pre-
mium placed by the Indian state on “tribal” belonging (in the guise of preferential 
discrimination) has imbued the label with such significance that it has become 
highly beneficial for political actors to position themselves ideologically within its 
confines (Middleton 2013, 13). In the Garo Hills, one of the more extreme spin-
offs of this has been the emergence of numerous insurgent groups; currently more 
than a dozen. Some of these have made (and continue to make) much more exten-
sive and explicit political demands than others, but ultimately they all call for the 
creation of a Garo homeland, or a “separate state” (which would, nonetheless, 
remain within the Indian federation). Even though many Garo seem sympathetic 
to this cause, which has also been formulated as a demand by some of the main-
stream political parties (Khan 2014), that does not necessarily translate into direct 
support for the insurgent groups. While some people regard the groups’ members 
as opportunists who present themselves in politically fashionable terms in order 
to make “easy money,” at the same time most people are reluctant to completely 
denounce the armed insurgents’ principles.
The ethnicization of politics has also affected the borders between states within 
the Indian federation. The boundary of the state of Meghalaya, which did not 
exist before 1972, has become a significant political issue. In neighboring Assam, 
Garo do not enjoy the same benefits as the Garo who live within the state of 
Meghalaya.6 Some political activists therefore propose that “Garo majority” parts 
of Assam should be included within Meghalaya, so that Assamese Garo may gain 
the same treatment. Political groups that claim to represent the Rabha community, 
which resides in the same contested area, dispute this Garo claim. Political conflict 
has ensued, which turns ugly every now and then, as in November 2013 when six 
Rabha were killed by members of an insurgent group known as the Garo National 
Liberation Army (The Indian Express 2013).
To complicate matters, the Garo Hills region is also located at the border with 
Bangladesh. This border, which came into being with the partition of British India 
in 1947, constitutes a rather artificial boundary between the Garo Hills and the 
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adjacent plains of Bengal. The proximity to the border has proven advantageous 
to the insurgent groups, enabling them to seek refuge from the Indian security 
forces on Bangladeshi soil (van Schendel 2005, 281). Due to its location at the 
periphery of Indian territory, the Indian state has made particular efforts to ensure 
Garo Hills’ administrative and political consolidation. This has resulted in a wide 
range of measures aimed to promote development in the uplands, many of which 
have been inclined to discourage cultivators from shifting cultivation, and thereby 
indirectly fostered the privatization of land.
The most significant way in which the insurgent groups manifest themselves is 
by levying “tax” (or extorting money) from non-Garo persons living in the hills. 
However, this “tax” is also demanded from affluent Garo who are seen to profit 
from the current situation. These latter Garo, almost without exception, derive 
their wealth from the influential positions that they hold in the state administra-
tion, and their consequent personal involvement with the disbursement of funds. 
Meghalaya continues to top corruption rankings in India, at least in popular per-
ception, which has an enormously disruptive impact on both the people who are 
believed to profit from it and those who cannot (Mawrie 2016; The Times of India 
2014; The Shillong Times 2014). Considering that the insurgent movements direct 
their efforts not only against ethnic “outsiders” but also at affluent Garo, their 
emergence can perhaps also be understood as a reaction to the growing inequality 
within the Garo community. The privatization of village land deprives people of an 
asset that was previously commonly shared: the right to create swidden. Access to 
this asset had to be negotiated with the deities. The village head made sacrifices to 
them, on behalf of (and supported by) the entire village, which provided him with 
the legitimacy to be regarded as its (titular) owner. Particularly for people who have 
received a couple of years of schooling, swidden agriculture is no longer regarded 
as an attractive occupation. Nor is much regret expressed about the decline of 
the community religion, although the latter has significantly reduced the redistri-
bution of wealth through competitive feasting. State funding, which comes from 
the central government, and which Garo themselves do not contribute toward 
insofar as they do not pay income tax, is also regarded as a kind of common good. 
It should therefore perhaps not come as a surprise that those who are involved in 
the insurgent movements are often those who have been excluded from lucrative 
access to the state, and therefore target, among others, those who do enjoy such 
access. In other words, the fact that the erstwhile right to shared assets is no longer 
upheld may arguably lend a rather inarticulate sense of legitimacy to the extortion 
of those within the home community who are seen to monopolize those assets.
Conclusion: The changing morality of owning and sharing
In this article I have shown that the process by which Garo uplanders’ land is 
being transformed from a collectively managed asset into private property is driven 
by various factors. The state has not forced villagers to privatize communally held 
land, but it has endowed the heads of villages with personal ownership rights, 
dispensed funding for the development of sedentary forms of land usage, and fos-
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tered the emergence of an elite that utilizes state funding for the advancement of 
political projects. In the political discourse that is characteristic for the region, the 
state (often seen to be embodied by the security forces) easily appears in opposi-
tion to “local” ethnic political actors. Yet, as I have shown, in Northeast India the 
state has become deeply engrained within local political and social constellations.
As I have shown, the imposition of state-led notions of legality, and their adapta-
tion to local contexts, has far-reaching consequences for the people concerned. State 
laws do not so much replace customary arrangements as transform them. The peo-
ple who, in their daily lives, encounter these laws (as well as the development proj-
ects imposed, the offices created, and the types of knowledge generated) are not just 
passive recipients. Rather, they actively acquire what comes their way, interpreting 
laws, policies, ideas, and knowledge within the context of their own everyday social 
relationships. At the same time, this input transforms the people addressed, challeng-
ing them to redefine themselves and their experiences of the world around them.
The state imposition and legalization of village boundaries has had conse-
quences for the local political structure, having made the authority of a village 
head more dependent on external legality than on the consensus of the people 
among whom he lives. More entrepreneurial villagers soon discovered how the 
state legislature could allow them to gain permanent control over large portions 
of land, at the cost of those who did not have the economic leverage required for 
such acquisitions. The adoption of these permanent boundaries has thus trans-
formed the kinds of social relationships that are maintained within a village. More 
or less simultaneously, the adoption of Christianity has reduced the need to engage 
in redistributive ritual, thereby facilitating, allowing, and justifying the accumula-
tion of wealth by individual households. Transformations in the legal and political 
parameters that defined people’s lives have thus stimulated changes in cosmology 
and outlook, and vice versa.
The turn toward Christianity has provided people with a certain degree of pro-
tection against the whims of the community religion’s deities, while at the same 
time allowing them to cease practicing the many costly redistributive rituals called 
for by the community religion. I have not come across any evidence that mission-
aries ever explicitly promoted the household as a property-owning unit, yet this 
has been an outcome of the adoption of Christianity. It involved not so much an 
act of overt persuasion but rather what Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff have 
subtly described as the gradual “internalization of a set of values, as an ineffable 
manner of seeing and being” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1986, 2). As a consequence, 
conversion to Christianity has allowed households to amass wealth, and in Sadol-
para most of the wealthier villagers were Christians. The developmental efforts of 
the Indian state, which, among other consequences, have led to the construction 
of roads, have encouraged villagers to increasingly participate in the market econ-
omy. With a growing need for cash, people have become more inclined to cultivate 
cash crops, which—for those who are able to make orchards—makes them less 
economically dependent on shifting cultivation.
This movement away from shifting cultivation became possible because people 
abandoned the community religion. By becoming Christians, the ultimate own-
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ership of land shifted from nature toward the Christian God. And, when people 
began to identify themselves as citizens of the Indian state, the legislature of which 
could defend their property rights, it can be argued that by extension the state 
became an absolute owner as well. At the same time, by adopting Christianity, 
people at least theoretically gained the option to stop cultivating their swiddens. 
While the decline of the community religion has thus, in a way, “freed” people 
from their traditional obligations, Christianity has defined new modalities of shar-
ing, in which redistributive feasting has not been entirely abandoned but no doubt 
occurs less frequently than previously. Former cosmological sanctions may not 
have much credibility for people who have distanced themselves from the com-
munity religion, yet the social taboo on what is considered antisocial behavior 
remains, as is evident from the example given in the fourth section of this article. 
Some economic transactions may be upheld and endorsed by the laws of the state, 
yet still be considered socially unacceptable. What degree of sharing is compulsory, 
and what can be avoided, depends on social consensus, embedded and anchored 
as it is within cosmological values. Those who engage with neoliberal markets are 
faced with the challenge of how to strive for a reasonable profit without being per-
ceived as egocentric or greedy. The latter could come at the cost of damaging the 
very social relationships that are central to Garo sociality.
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Notes
1. I am grateful to the North Eastern Social Research Centre at Guwahati for providing me 
with an intellectually stimulating environment as well as a workspace, which enabled me to 
finalize this article, and to the Indian Council for Social Science Research (ICSSR) and the 
Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) for funding the research project 
“Markets, Ethics, and Agency: Changing Land Utilization and Social Transformation in the 
Uplands of Northeast India,” in the context of which I could write this article. In addition, 
work on this article has been facilitated by the project “Postcolonial Displacements: Migra-
tion, Narratives, and Place-Making in South Asia” funded by the Leiden profile area Asian 
Modernities and Traditions.
2. I use the term “community religion” to refer to the complex of practices, ideas, and myths 
that make up the religious epistemology that was dominant prior to the widespread Christian 
conversions among the Garo. I use “community religion” rather than “religion” (or “Garo 
religion”) to avoid the suggestion that these practices and ideas have been codified to the 
degree of religions that are organized hierarchically, base their teachings on texts, and employ 
professionals such as priests, pastors, or muezzins.
3. This article draws on research that I have conducted in Northeast India from 1999 onward. 
Substantial data was collected in the early 2000s, when I lived for nearly two years in the 
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Garo Hills while I conducted my PhD research. Some of the material has been referred to 
previously in the book chapter “On the Nature of Indigenous Land, Ownership, Access, and 
Farming in Upland Northeast India” (de Maaker 2018).
4. I am grateful for the valuable comments made on an earlier version of this article by the 
two anonymous reviewers for Asian Ethnology as well as for the comments and suggestions 
that I received from Deborah Tooker, the co-editor of this themed forum. I would also like to 
acknowledge Pip Hare, who edited this article for English.
5. Derived from a recitation at Jamegapa by Jiji M. Sangma, September 2, 2000.
6. In Assam, the Garo have been categorized as a Scheduled Tribe since 2002, which does 
not, however, result in the same benefits as apply to Garo residents of the state of Meghalaya 
(Khan 2014).
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